Abstract-The paper presents a qualitative approach to analyze the security and survivability of critical infrastructure networks. The analysis identifies threat mitigation strategies for each threat identified and provides suggestions for improved security and survivability. The proposed approach could be applied during the planning and design phase of new projects to evaluate different design alternatives or to assess the vulnerability and survivability of an existing system. The paper presents the results of an in-depth interview survey conducted to identify the normal usage scenarios and possible attack scenarios and their impact on the operations of transportation management centers. The proposed approach provides a significant addition to the current design practices by integration system security and survivability in the design process. A cost-benefit analysis of the proposed mitigation strategies should provide transportation officials with a decision making tool to evaluate different design alternatives and to improve the overall survivability of urban city networks. While the case-study presented in the paper focused on urban transportation networks, the proposed qualitative approach presented can be applied to any other critical infrastructure distribution, control, and monitoring networks.
communication infrastructure in separation.
In this paper, a modified Survivable System Analysis (SSA) that can be used to assess the security and survivability of critical infrastructure networks is presented. The qualitative technique presented in this paper is based on the canonical SSA, but modified for critical infrastructures by including the development of a stakeholder-by-responsibility matrix, the enumeration of both physical and cyber threats, and the development of a threat-by-component matrix. The analysis identifies threat mitigation strategies for each threat identified and provides suggestions for improved security and survivability.
II. BACKGROUND
Several approaches to assessing a transportation system for its ability to maintain essential service have been used. However, most of these approaches and strategies have focused primarily on reliability using a variety of performance measures such as connectivity and terminal reliability, capacity reliability, and travel time/travel cost reliability [1] - [3] . While reliability serves as an adequate measure for assigning the probabilities of satisfying a fixed level of performance based on the presence of benign factors, it does not consider the weakness (vulnerability) of network operating under extreme conditions. Connectivity, or terminal reliability, is defined as "the probability that nodes are connected, such that it is possible to reach a destination from a given source [4] ." While connectivity is a valid measure for some networked systems (e.g., power systems or sparsely used communications networks), it does not adequately reflect capacity constraints of different links on the network.
A more accurate measure in this sense is capacity reliability, which can be defined as "the probability that the network can accommodate a specific demand level" [5] . Capacity reliability, while accounts for the ability of a system to satisfy demand through adequate service, it does not exclusively indicate how well demand is satisfied. Travel time (or cost) reliability is defined as "the probability that a trip can be successfully finished within a specified time interval (or at less than a specified cost)" [6] .
Survivability, while not commonly addressed in transportation literature, forms a prominent area of active research in networked systems. Carnegie-Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute originated an analytic approach for networked systems referred to as the Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) in 1997 [7] - [10] . Step 1. Define the System's Mission Statement Identify stakeholders, components, ownership,
Step 7. Develop Network Survivability Map
Identify threats are listed along with affected components and services, and for each of these threats, current strategies and recommended improvements are listed.
Step 6. Identify Threat Mitigation Strategies
Analyze system components for mitigations to the threats identified earlier
Step 5. Define Possible Attack Scenarios and Threats Define a list of attack and accident scenarios, along with corresponding components and services. Threats include both physical and electronic.
Step
Identify Stakeholder Needs and Responsibilities
Identify stakeholders' needs and which stakeholders are responsible for which components and services.
Step 3 Define Logical System Components and Architecture
Define network architecture in terms of network topology, component locations and component interactions.
Step 4 Define Normal Usage Scenarios:
Identify Normal usage scenarios (NUS) and associate them with components and services The SSA-based qualitative technique presented in this paper modifies the canonical technique applied in survivable network analysis to make it applicable to critical infrastructures such as ITS networks. The three major modifications are: 1) including the development of a stakeholder-by-responsibility matrix, 2) the enumeration of both physical and cyber threats, and 3) the development of a threat-by-component matrix. The analysis identifies threat mitigation strategies for each threat identified and provides suggestions for improved security and survivability [12] - [14] .
III. QUALITATIVE SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR ITS NETWORKS
The combined security and survivability analysis process presented in this paper is based on the modified SSA process and defines seven steps, illustrated in Fig. 1-a and Fig. 1-b . The following subsections further describe each of these stages.
IV. CASE STUDY: TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CENTERS
The objective of this part of the analysis was to identify typical normal usage scenarios and possible attack scenarios and their impact on traffic management centers (TMC) operations. Data were collected through phone interviews with 17 TMC operators throughout North America. An example of different components of an ITS system is presented in Figure 2 . The Figure shows the Treasure Valley, Idaho ITS proposed architecture with several project components and communication architecture [15] . The multilayer representation of a typical ITS network is presented in Fig. 3 which shows three different infrastructure layers within the system: 1) power network layer, 2) communication network layer, and 3) physical (roadway) network layer. The figure also shows the failure propagation across layers that were used in the qualitative analysis presented in this paper. TMC operators identified three primary and core functions for the TMCs: 1) provide optimal traffic management and control, 2) provide surveillance and monitoring of the network operations, and 3) disseminate travel information to the public. These three functions are clearly interdependent. As part of the phone interview, TMC operators were asked to rank the effect of losing the functionality of one or more of the field devices in the network. Summary of the results is presented in Table I and Table II. Based on the survey results, loss of communication to/from a local controller will have low/moderate effect on the network operations as controllers will implement the time-of-day default control plans stored in the local controllers. However, a loss of communication to a Closed Circuit TV camera (CCTV) or a Changeable Message Sign (SMS) can have a major (high) effect on the network operations especially during peak travel periods or during incident situations.
Loss of power at a local controller will have moderate/high effect on the network operations. Intersection control in such case will be done manually, which require dispatching personnel to the site, or through an all-way-stop-control mode, which could cause excessive network delay, especially at major intersections. Effective traffic management plans for critical intersections during power outages was identified by TMC operators as the key mitigation strategy for such case. Findings from the analysis also showed that a loss of power supply or communication at the TMC could have a paralyzing effect on the ability of the network to provide several of its essential services. An operational-ready alternate TMC and a redundant communication system to the TMC were identified as possible mitigation strategies for these threats.
V. SURVIVABLE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The primary mission of the TMC is to develop and maintain safe and efficient traffic management and operations throughout the city network. Three objectives have been identified: a) Reduce congestion and improve traffic safety along major corridors in the network.
b) Be exportable to other parts of the region and the state. c) Archive and maintain traffic data for continuous system monitoring and evaluation and make this information available on a real-time basis for all stakeholders.
The TMS essential needs were identified as 1) provide efficient control and surveillance operations, 2) provide convenient means to control network components, collect and archive data, and observe data and/or visual images in real time, and 3) distribute the above data and information to different stakeholders.
After the needs were mapped out to the various stakeholders, a mapping of component ownership was completed. Example of stakeholder x responsibility/access matrix is presented in Table III . Furthermore, the stakeholders involved in the TMC operation were interviewed to establish normal usage scenarios. Example of the normal usage scenarios matrix is presented in Table IV . 
A. Attack Scenarios and Threats
Based on surveys of various electronic and physical components of the TMC components, anecdotal observations, and evidence of relaxed security, 18 attack scenarios were formulated. Physical and electronic threats are then listed under the appropriate compromised component category. Physical threats include such events as accidental digging into fibers, lightning, flood, projectiles, and traffic accidents. Electronic threats consist of data storms, insufficient bandwidth, unauthorized access, and signal degradation. Signal heads also attract lightning, which is a well-known cause of malfunction in signal controllers. These threats are then organized into a Threat-Component Matrix to illustrate the amount of components that each threat potentially possesses.
B. Threat Mitigation Strategies
By combining information from the project concept of operations with prior knowledge of communications networks in the electric power grid, it was possible to categorize a wide variety of components used in a local intelligent transportation system. Also with prior knowledge, it was easy to categorize numerous potential threats to these components, and appropriate mitigation for each of these threats.
Components were categorized into 15 types, and listed potential physical and electronic threats to each of these components. In full analysis, 32 classes of threats were identified, each affecting from 1 to 12 or more components. Between 1 and 7 mitigation strategies were identified for each class. Components and mitigations overlapped, but this still produced a very large mapping of threats to components and mitigations, a portion of which is shown in Table V 
C. Survivability Map
Improved or additional mitigation strategies to the attack scenarios and physical/electronic threats are summarized in the survivability map. Current strategies and recommended strategies accompany the resistance, recognition, and recovery of each attack scenario. The study determined that the most significant threat the traffic system is a large-scale power outage. As a result of such outage, traffic conditions on an already congested system can lead to full system congestion. Emergency traffic management plans for such situations need to be developed and continuously updated. A cost-benefit analysis of each recommended strategy would naturally progress henceforth.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The paper presented a qualitative approach to assess the security and survivability of a transportation management network as an example of critical infrastructure networks. The process presented in this paper consists of seven steps: mission statement, stakeholder needs, responsibility, and access, logical system components and architecture, normal usage scenarios, attack, scenarios and threats, threat mitigation strategies, and survivability map. The proposed approach could be applied during the planning and design phase of critical infrastructure networks to evaluate different design alternatives or to assess the vulnerability and survivability of an existing network.
To identify typical normal usage scenarios and possible attack scenarios and their impact on traffic management centers (TMC) operations, in-depth interviews with 17 TMC operators throughout North America were conducted. Findings from the survey analysis showed that a loss of power supply at the TMC or at critical network intersections could have a paralyzing effect on the ability of the network to provide several of its essential services. An operational-ready alternate TMC and effective traffic management plans for critical intersections during power outages were identified as possible mitigation strategies for these threats. The proposed survivability analysis was also applied to the TMC operations. The analysis identified attack scenarios and threats, threat mitigation as well as survivability map with improved or additional threat mitigation strategies for different design alternatives.
The proposed approach provides a significant addition to the current design practices of different critical infrastructure networks by integration system security and survivability in the design process. A cost-benefit analysis of the proposed mitigation strategies should provide officials with a decision making tool to evaluate different design alternatives and to improve the overall security and survivability of critical infrastructure networks. 
